Agenda item

4.1     The Chair welcomed the guests from Thames Water to the meeting. The officers addressed the committee and provided a handout. The following key points were noted:

·         Thames Water apologises for the recent floods in Lewisham, to councillors and to the public. The impact was devastating and Thames Water has been trying to speak to as many residents affected as possible to give apologies and make sure they are not out of pocket as a result.

·         In the last 6 months there have been a number of similar high profile incidents. An internal review has been carried out and no single cause found. There are a range of issues related to old assets and also access issues.

·         A wider strategic external review is being carried out and Thames Water will act on its findings.

·         In Lewisham last year Thames Water repaired 1448 leaks equating to 39 million litres of water: 16-18 Olympic pools were fixed in last 12 months in Lewisham.

·         In the next 12 months Thames Water are going to invest in 95000 metres of network and continue to work with TfL and highways officers in boroughs.

4.2       Sarah Hurcomb gave an overview of the two incidents in Lewisham:

·         On 26 November 2016 Thames Water were notified that a 24inch trunk main had burst in Lee High Road, which resulted in significant flooding and closure of a TFL red route for 11 days. The devastation was awful.

·         There was additional media interest as, as a result of a sink hole, a coach got stuck and it was a significant exercise to remove people from the coach.

·         When Thames Water were finally able to control and isolate the water supply this resulted in 3000 customers without water for 7 hours, although alternative water supplies were made available.

·         This main does not directly feed any customers, but indirectly feeds about 118,000 people and Thames Water had to be mindful of that when closing the supply. This main needs 4 valves to be shut to isolate it, 24 inch mains require a turn a minute to shut them slowly and safely.

·         There were additional challenges because the valves were buried under a 4 way traffic junction so engineers had to be escorted onto the junction to do that.

·         There were also high voltage cables and gas pipes, so UK power networks had to be on site to facilitate safe access.

·         There then followed a complex clean up exercise. Loss adjustors and a flood response team were on site within 2 hours, one of Thames Water’s directors was on site for the first day to manage and respond to media requests and a senior manager was on site every day.

·         Three residents meetings were held in 11 days after the incident to answer questions and Thames Water did all it could to support customers. The support continues now depending on the needs of the customer.

·         Work is still ongoing to return customers’ lives back to how they were before the incident, Thames Water don’t underestimate the impact of this on people’s lives, which is why there is an independent  enquiry taking place.

·         The second major incident in Lewisham was on Lee Road on 9 December 2016. A 12 inch main burst, which was caused by third party damage to the main. This caused flooding and loss of supply to customers.

·         12 people had to be relocated from their homes, Sarah personally attended the site the next day and was there 3-4 days that week and met with residents the following Friday to help and support them.

·         The electricity supply had to be turned off and there was lots of damaged stock for local businesses as basements of commercial buildings were flooded.

·         Some people are still not able to return to their homes as a result of this flood so there is a lot to learn: this will be included in the independent review.

·         Thames Water will support a celebratory event for the local businesses and support the residents. They found a great community spirit amongst the residents.

·         Initially when there is an incident, Thames Water work closely with emergency services to start with (the borough commanders present were thanked for their officers’ support and work at such incidents) and then once the location had been made safe: customers become number one priority.

·         Thames Water twitter and website communications don't always get things right and they are working to improve that.

·         Thames Water need to provide a bespoke service so they respond to individual needs. To achieve this they work closely with loss adjusters and build a long term relationship with impacted customers. This process has been tested a lot in the last five months, some customers use Thames Water loss adjusters, some choose to use their own insurance. This is up to customer and Thames Water provide customers with pros and cons for each option.

4.3     Andrew Sherry and Mufu Durowojo from TfL addressed the committee. The following key points were noted:

·         Andrew and Mufu are responsible for works coordination and permitting, so they are involved in all planned and unplanned work on the TfL network.

·         As soon as TfL were made aware by emergency services (via the TfL 247 control centre) of the incident, they sent out their contractors, initially to resolve traffic management, and then via further enforcement to make the roads safe.

·         A key role was to look at traffic signal timings for a wider area, to implement signals to give more green time in other areas.

·         TfL communicate via social media so put information on twitter to get people to avoid the area, they also contacted the local authority to make sure all were involved.

·         TfL management were dispatched to site to see if they could assist further with the recovery of the stranded coach, but because of the significant size of the void the coach couldn't be moved. TfL assisted with getting the crane on site to remove the coach the following day.

·         Throughout the incident, the response was coordinated by the local authority and Thames Water on site and for quite some time afterwards due to the significance of the void and the mains underneath and the gas and electric cables on top.

·         Senior officials met and agreed points for signs to try to ensure a wider range of people were aware of the disruption and to seek alternative routes. In an attempt to minimise disruption, TfL shared information, requested 24,7 working by Thames Water and rapid setting concrete to reduce the time to set from 7 days down to hours.

·         TfL worked closely with the Council’s emergency planning and highway officers and consulted them about amending the diversion routes where needed.

·         TfL manage 5% of London roads, but those roads carry 30% of all London traffic.

·         Because of the severity of the numerous incidents over the last few months, TfL commissioners wrote formally to the Chief Executive of Thames Water and followed up with a meeting to attempt to address TfL concerns and try to understand what Thames Water were doing to further invest and deal with the current situation.

·         Whilst TfL acknowledge there will be more leaks in winter, they also want to know what more can be done by Thames Water in the medium and longer term to prevent major leaks. TfL want to encourage and support further investment, by Thames Water into their assets and network, and TfL would welcome further discussions as to how the upgrade of the trunk main network will be achieved.

·         The recent examples show what happens if there isn’t sufficient investment and TfL don’t want that to continue, they want to balance the delivery of an upgraded trunk main network with the disruption that will cause, with the disruption caused by unplanned emergency incidents caused by aging infrastructure.

4.4       In response to questions of Thames Water and TfL the following was noted:

·         There have been other incidents within Lewisham, the hole impacting on trains through Forest Hill, the sink hole and leaks at Perry Vale causing lots of inconvenience.

·         The two major incidents in Lee were not directly related as one was caused by third party damage. There are times where a weakness and leak in one part of the main being fixed can cause further pressures down the main leading to further leaks.

·         There is concern amongst members about the magnitude of the incidents happening as it seems as though there are large scale trunk main failures happening more regularly. In Lewisham alone, 33% of permits issued by TfL have been for immediate permits i.e. to deal with leak/incidents on trunk main roads after the event rather than scheduled work which can be planned to reduce congestion and disruption.

·         The issue outside Grove Park station was outlined by a member, highlighting ongoing issues at a key traffic junction over the last 5 years, which has had one lane closed at least 4 times in the last month alone. Early attention to a leak that was present for many months was not provided initially. The quality of restorative work was also questioned. In response, Thames Water advised that a number of leaks were detected but were not visible, so this led to three dry holes (where they start to excavate where they think the leak is and then not find it and have to seal the hole back up). There was an issue with a temporary road surface that was put in which was exacerbated by bad weather meaning it took longer to resolve. Work is being done on improving detection methods and a number of trials are being undertaken.

·         It was accepted that better communication with local people, councillors and police was needed in circumstances like that outside Grove Park station, and a clearer standard procedure of liaison would help.

·         Technology to assist with the detection and resolution of leaks is being investigated and invested in.

·         Thames Water have 32000 km of water mains, of which 12000 are trunk mains (bigger than 12inches), 25% of these are more than 100 years old. Age as of itself is not the only predictor of likelihood to leak: some of 1970s mains ones are some of the weakest.

·         Thames Water try to predict where mains are most likely to burst and that modelling says where they go to first. The modelling is complex resulting in a “hit list” for replacement. The mains are replaced with 2 inch thick plastic pipes, but London is built on clay so the mains are under stress.

·         Thames Water monitor their network constantly, focusing on the high risk mains, and are trying to understand why leaks happen. They also need to provide bigger mains as more people are using more water.

·         As part of the strategic review being undertaken, Thames Water are talking to the best experts in the world to see what more they can do and how to drive innovation to go faster with replacement programmes and bring the price down as it currently costs £1000s per metre.

·         The two issues in Perry Vale could have been related: one repair increased pressure further down at the bottom of Sunderland Road. When one repair is completed they do check in the wider area to make sure the problem has not been moved further down the pipe. Thames Water officers are not sure where the work still required in Perry Vale sits on their planned list of work: they will follow up with that detail.

·         The network is made up of district areas and zones so water can be redistributed where needed via a number of cross connections. This requires a delicate balance to not have low pressure or surges, it is very complex to manage.

·         Thames Water do look at drainage capabilities as part of their work, they are often called out incorrectly to surface water area which they believe is related to gullies and there is nothing they can do within their network.

·         30% of residents currently have meters, usage for the rest is guesswork - more meters would give a better understanding of how water is used in homes and in the network. This area is at the bottom of the Thames Water basin so a lot of South Downs water ends up here.

4.5       Peter Agent, Dave Wheeler and Geoff Tice gave an overview of the role of local highways officers. The key points to note were:

·         They are responsible for non-red route areas and pick up the residual effect of what happens on the red route.

·         There were 1000 incidents that they would consider serious in the last 12 months, which gives the local authority a huge amount of work to co-ordinate, also taking into account all the other permit requests.

·         Officers have to try to manage the whole network to work together, collaborate with utility companies and TfL, try to ensure companies use the best materials and get the best advice possible.

·         37 permits are issued a week on average for Thames Water – this illustrates the numbers being dealt with – more needs to be done around planning rather than constant reactive work.

·         Cuts to local authority budgets have not impacted on the Council’s ability to process permit requests as the process is funded by the permit scheme.

·         Thames Water representatives advised that it is incumbent on them and other utility companies to collaborate and work more effectively.

It was agreed to suspend standing orders.

4.6       In further discussions with officers the following points were noted:

·         The response of officers in Lee was exemplary, with regular updates to local councilors which was well appreciated.

·         Businesses are still feeling the impact of being closed in the busy pre-Christmas period.

·         Feedback from those who were flooded has generally been positive in relation to the speed of response from Thames Water.

·         Contacting Thames Water can be a challenge for councillors, emails to generic email addresses do not get answered – a clear contact point for local councilors would be helpful.

·         The cause of a leak/water pressure issues in the Broadway Theatre was never clarified.

·         There is an issue with leaking water in Sangley Road at the junction of access with Lidl.

4.7       RESOLVED: That

(a)  Thames Water, TfL and Lewisham Highways officers be thanked for attending the meeting and explaining the causes of, and actions in relation to, the disruption.

(b)  The further information requested within the discussion be provided, including the review reports when they are published.